on its society will be in relation to the degree of its legitimacy among members of the political community, as well as according to the nature of their participation in politics. A loose form of corporatism (lacking the historic features of Gleichschaltung associated with European corporate systems of the 1930s and 1940s) was the historical solution of the Pahlavi state . In the end, corporatism led to the bureaucratization of the state's power and of the regime attempts to control mass participation. In the formulation of public policy, the objective of Muhammad Riza Pahlavi, shah since 1941, was to maximize the people's support for the state and minimize their demands upon it.7
In corporate state systems, interests are centered in units that are "singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered, functionally differentiated." The state creates such units and licenses them to provide a monopoly of representation in designated functional areas. There is, however, no question of such units, once licensed, becoming free of the state. In fact, they must observe limits upon their activity which are set by the state through constitutional, statutory, or administrative codes.8 Such arrangements are well suited to the strategy of maximizing supports while minimizing demands. And although the Pahlavi state was not able to mobilize power to the degree that some have suggested, it did have formidable repressive capacity when the regime chose to apply repression.
Yet, the corporatism advanced by the Pahlavi state contained a critical weakness. In an area of the world where the religious basis of political legitimacy is of central importance, the Pahlavi state so excluded Shi'ism that it failed to gain religiously sanctioned moral acceptance. Nor did the regime come even remotely close to meshing its corporatist structure with the salvationist yearnings of Shi'ites-especially the petite bourgeoisie and those at the bottom of the economic pyramid. In both prospect and retrospect one can see that this failure was due to two things: the coextensiveness of the religious and political spheres in Islam, and the abiding determination of Iranian Shi'ites to withhold their approval from the shah's claim to legitimacy. This is not to say that Shi'i doctrine categorically rejects the legitimacy of all temporal rulers. However, at best, the authority of such a ruler is subject to review, and it may be denied entirely; the precept that awards ultimate legitimate rule to the Imam alone has been utilized as doctrinal justification for rebellion against an impious ruler.9
The Pahlavi variant of corporatism was structurally flawed in consequence. A wide gap existed between the corporatist organization of the economy and political life, on the one hand, and the continued if enfeebled ability of the religious forces to resist cooptation into the institutions of the Pahlavi system on the other. Through this gap were to pour the revolutionary masses, eventually overthrowing the old regime and initiating a new state order that remains difficult to categorize.
THE STRUCTURE OF PAHLAVI CORPORATISM
The structure of Pahlavi corporatism can best be illuminated by discussion of its institutions and public policies. This dual emphasis will highlight matters of organization and social mobility. There is consensus that the Iranian political system from the time of World War II took on the following forms: 1941-53, pluralist politics; 1953-63, authoritarian mobilization politics; 1963-79, monarchical absolutism and bureaucratization of power. Although the features of the last period had their origin and development in the earlier years, this discussion will focus on the final period of the shah's rule.
During these sixteen years the major institutions of the state were the monarchy, the intelligence services, the military, the central planning apparatus, and certain key ministries, such as interior and information. There was a party structure, but it remained an ancillary feature of the regime and failed in its purpose to mobilize masses and intellectuals behind the shah's "White Revolution. "
The central role of the monarchy is so obvious and has so often been cited'? that not much need be added beyond the note that whereas the country's constitution (1906-7) stipulated that the shah reign-not rule-the actions of this shah since 1953 were in full disregard of these provisions. Though his military-based monarchy may not have become an arrant "fascist-style totalitarian regime," I his manipulation of politics resulted in the gross violation of the country's fundamental law.
The identification of the state with the monarchy, if not with the person of the shah, became the key objective of this ruler. He used the security services and the army to ensure his purpose, and the proliferation of agencies within the military-security establishment to accomplish his ends should cause less surprise than the fact that internal rivalries among chiefs of agencies did not surface more often than they did. Of the numerous units, "four [were] in some ways overt police units, and the other four [performed] various intelligence and secret police functions."12
Since military power alone is insufficient and inefficient in administering a society, the army, police, and intelligence services did not serve as day-to-day instruments of rule. The shah had to rely upon a socioeconomic program which government language characterized as progressive and even "revolutionary." Because the state in many societies can mobilize such extensive power, it often becomes the paramount entrepreneur, as well. The shah's third, fourth, and fifth development plans (1962-79) were the major instruments of national integration. The expansion of the national market, under the aegis of national planning, into the periphery was an orchestrated effort that led to the sedentarization of the tribes, the capitalization of agriculture, the emergence of a massive oil sector, and the growth of a modest, if internationally uncompetitive, manufacturing sector. As part of this system, two new classes came into increasing evidence: the middle class and the industrial working class.
In the 1960s and 1970s the regime destroyed the autonomy of the organizations of these two classes. Such organizations had already begun to emerge by the 1920s, and the labor movement had been a vital part of the Iranian political scene up to mid century, with membership approaching half a million. 13 After his reinstatement on the throne in 1953, the shah reacted to the power of the working-class organizations by creating official unions that became integrated into the Pahlavi state. The Ministry of Labor, moreover, had less to do with the organizational aspects of these unions than did the secret police. 14 As for the middle class, it did not enjoy independence, even though as a group it benefited a good deal from the modernization policies of the shah. That this class acquiesced to, but without participating in, decisions of the regime derived from its gains in growth from the industrialization policies. Deprived of decision-making authority for its institutions, especially the syndicates and the Chamber of Commerce, the middle class could not take the initiative on broad policy issues.15 But this did not matter as long as members of this class, as individuals, continued to enjoy prosperity. In summary, the Pahlavi state seemed patterned after corporate political systems, a chief trait of which is to keep access to the levers of power restricted to a small elite while establishing a hierarchical facade that purports to organize broad mass participation in endeavors of public choice. In evolving the corporate structure, an ideology was fashioned which in its pronouncements stressed distribution but which in practice favored production.
II Ervand
This leads, then, to the question of which groups benefited most from such policies and which lost the most? The capitalist middle class was probably the most direct beneficiary of these policies. This was largely related to the phenomenal increase of oil revenues after 1973, but it was also linked to deliberate administrative decisions already adopted in the previous decade to push hard for the consolidation of the middle-class, which had emerged in the 1930s. The spread of the industrial and foreign trade markets in the following decades led to the rise of a more clearly identifiable middle class, which the shah intended to make the social basis of his state while simultaneously denying it real decision-making authority. A corporate group of financiers, investors, traders, and industrialists thus arose as a consequence of over-all economic growth in Iran.
The investment ratio is a good general index of sectoral growth, and in the years 1962 through 1973 (the period of the third and fourth development plans), vast sums were channeled by the government into the economic sectors. Supplementing that effort was investment by private entrepreneurs, whose total investments amounted to "some two-thirds to three-quarters as much as the public sector .. ." 16 The relatively favorable position of private entrepreneurs may also be seen from figures on expenditures by urban families, as shown in Figures for a single case are indicative, but a comparative perspective is more helpful. In a recent essay,18 the discrepancy between rich and poor in Iran under the shah is shown to have been greater than that in Egypt, where the economy has been historically weak. The data, shown in Table 2 reform and became owners as a result amounted to 15 percent of the total number of landowners.20 The groups that lost most heavily under the shah's programs were the tribes, the poor peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie (bazaar merchants, shopkeepers, and artisans), and the urban poor (low-income industrial workers, self-employed-such as taxi drivers-and the lumpenproletariat). It will be noted that the landed aristocracy is not included in this list of losers. The reason is that this class was invited, on terms favorable to it, to become part of the urban middle class of industrialists, financiers, and entrepreneurs, or, if they wished to remain in the countryside, to become partners in the large state-regulated agribusiness farms that were spreading throughout the country after the mid 1960s. But what role was assumed by the clergy apart from articulation of Imamite doctrine? Gradually and indirectly, they became the transmitters of the sayings, traditions, and practices of the imams and thus assumed the role of intermediary between the latter and the faithful. The emphasis must be upon the word "indirectly," because there is no doctrinal basis for arguing that the highest ranking clergymen, the mujtahids, received a categorical appointment from the imams themselves in their lifetimes to be the imams' replacements. Nevertheless, in a much later period, around the seventeenth century, tampering with the doctrinal principles appears to have occurred in order to make it seem as though a categorical, ex ante, appointment of mujtahids had been granted by the imams.24
The Imam's occultation also posed the dilemma of authority. If the community was to be organized, administered, and preserved according to a pattern that would be pleasing to God, then who was to lead? On this question the Imamites may be said to have equivocated. As long as they lived under Sunni rule, they were absolved from answering. The absence of a requirement for an oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to the hidden Imam until his reappearance permitted Shi'ites to be faithful and yet also acknowledge the rule of the Sunni caliph. However, after 1501, Imamite Shi'ism became the religion of a centralized Iranian state under the Safavid shahs (1501-1722). It became more and more urgent to discuss whether or not the clergy had doctrinal grounds for claiming the deputyship of the imams as secular shahs now began pressing such claims themselves.
Moreover, in the eighteenth century an intraclergy dispute resulted in a key victory on the doctrinal side for those who wanted an assertive social role for the clergy. The victorious faction successfully argued that the mujtahids were entitled to use their independent judgment in interpreting the law. A doctrinal principle consequently came to be used as a lever for clergy activism in social 23 matters beyond the narrow compass of ethical and pietistic concerns of the past. On this view, as against that which insisted no room existed for independent judgment, authoritative opinions (fatwas) could now be issued anathematizing secular policies. Empowered with this prerogative, the clergy became a corporate stratum whose leaders-the mujtahids-could expect imitation by the masses in practical and legal matters. The most distinguished of the mujtahids soon came to exercise great informal political influence. During the time of the Qajar shahs (1796-1925), the clergy began to claim that the eminent mujtahids of the age were, in fact, the proofs of the Imam. This doctrinal shift ensued from tampering with tradition, but the clergy mentally justified the slight-of-hand, no doubt, on grounds of the increasingly intolerable acts of their secular rulers.
What is interesting in all this is that at the time the centralized state was created in sixteenth-century Iran, the clergy were the state's clients. The creation of Shi'ism as a state religion in the 1500s was not due to influence of the mujtahids but rather to the decision of a Sufi leader responding to chiliastic expectations rife in northwest Iran and eastern Turkey. Having conquered the territory of Iran, this individual began then to import Shi'ite mujtahids into Iran to serve in the administration of the state. Clearly, then, these clergy were dependent upon and vulnerable to the granting or withdrawal of the state's largesse and the maneuverings of the shah. In due course, many of even the top-ranking clergymen who were already inside the country were brought into the state bureaucracy. Only a minority of the mujtahids in this period maintained a preferred aloofness from state service. Doctrinally, the religious leaders legitimated Safavid temporal rule by acquiescing in the claims made by the shahs to be the descendents of the seventh Imam, an acquiescence which added weight to the Safavids' claim to be rulers of the community. These shahs came to be known by the sobriquet appropriated by them, and not contested then by the clergy-zillullah, the shadow of God.
The increasing involvement of the clergy in politics in the most recent two centuries has had to do with a variety of causes, not all of them doctrinal. For instance, the increasing penetration of imperialism led the clergy to forge an alliance with intellectuals, artisans, and merchants. This political activism of the clergy did not amount to categorical challenges to the sovereignty of the shahs. The ruler continued to be regarded as an imperfect leader, and clergy protest was for the most part confined to very specific grievances against unjust decisions affecting local interests.25
When a strong mujtahid challenge to the shah did occur in 1891-92 over the grant of a tobacco monopoly to the British, the shah quickly capitulated. But even then his sovereign authority was not in jeopardy. A decade later, during the constitutional revolution (1905-11), the stronger doctrinal argument rested with anticonstitutionalist clergymen.
Nevertheless, Shi'i doctrine contains implicit justification for clergy assertiveness. First, they have the residual right to warn the community of the violation of the Imam's justice. Second, doctrinal justifications could be found for political action in the Qur'an, for example, "You are the best community I have sent forth among the people, commanding the good and enjoining from evil," and "O you who believe, obey God, obey the prophet and those in authority among you." Enforcing good and preventing evil are seen as ultimately political acts which the entire community may undertake. "Those in authority among you" are considered by Shi'ites to be the imams and even, some believe, the mujtahids.
In no sense, however, did the clergy advance doctrinal arguments for locating sovereignty in their own corporate group. When they perceived that their secular allies in the constitutional revolution were moving toward Western notions of popular sovereignty and republicanism, the clergy defected and ultimately sponsored the rise to the throne of a military officer who appeared to be willing to strengthen the cause of Shi'ism. It was thus ironic that this individual was to embark upon a series of policies which in fact led to the evisceration of the religious institution. Three generations later, however, the successors of these clergy would lead perhaps the most astounding revolution in modern times.
Is there an Islamic theory of collective action? From the Sunni perspective, the fundamental unit of social reality is the community of believers. Collective social action is conceived in terms of salvation, and the charisma of the community is the key to its attainment. The importance of community charisma and infallibility may be seen in the verse already cited-"You are the best community. .. . "-and in the saying, attributed to the prophet, "My community shall never agree upon error."
Collective social action against constituted authority is sanctioned only in the event of a ruler's impiety, but unanimously accepted criteria by which to assess the rule of princes do not exist. Moreover, no machinery evolved for use in applying sanctions against impious rulers. There is only the general guideline in the Qur'an that "there is no duty of obedience in sin."26
In fact, revolution is considered ultimately a threat to the will of God. The concept of God's community cannot be faulty, for it is based upon membership of believers who have accepted rule over animals and plants as a trust from Him; it is organized by those whom God has sent forth to be the leaders of mankind. Even if a ruler be impious, the danger of revolution to the community is so great that overriding proof of dereliction is required before Thus, revolutionary mobilization stemmed not from ideational responses to abstract doctrinal elements. Instead, it derived from the conjuncture of two factors: (1) the latitude the doctrine provided to the mujtahids to pronounce social criticism of impiety, and (2) the cathartic function of the passion play. The revolution occurred both because the masses wanted to improve their life chances and because they were engaging in concrete, practical, and-for them-stable reactions to maintain the integrity of their community. Simultaneously, Ayatullah Khumayni's use of dramaturgical symbols and his own occultation from society as an exile for fifteen years provided powerful leverage for revolutionary action. clergy. The latter carried the day, with predictable consequences for provisions favored by Shari'atmadari on questions of power and sovereignty.
A fifth issue separating the two grand mujtahids was that of freedom of association, speech, and the press. Shari'atmadari reasoned that dissonant views could be boycotted but should not be violently suppressed. The matter arose over the famous Ayandigan affair, in which that newspaper linked existence of a terrorist organization, Furqan, to religious motivations. The publication of material on Furqan's ideology and activities, without however any accompanying editorial comment, released a flood of accusations by IRPoriented clergy. Khumayni himself led IRP denunciations of the paper for printing what he regarded as anticlergy propaganda. In the end, a violent mob attack on the paper's plant led to casualties, the destruction of property, and the suspension of publication for a number of weeks. After a brief return to the newsstands under chastened circumstances, the paper was completely taken over by the IRP and renamed Azadigan.
The divergence between the views of Khumayni and Shari'atmadari widened in 1980 until the latter either was compelled or voluntarily withdrew into silence. Perhaps the most critical disagreement has been over the new constitution, approved in a December 1979 referendum, which transformed Iran into a theocratic state.33 Shari'atmadari's basic objection to the draft constitution submitted to the nation by the Council of Experts stemmed from his belief that articles 5 and 110, pertaining to the power of the faqih (the supreme clerical leader), and the provisions of articles 6 and 56, relating to national sovereignty, contravened one another. Shari'atmadari trenchantly, if politely, maintained that Shi'i doctrine has no provision at all for the principle of vilayat-i faqih (rule exercised on behalf of the imam by the supreme clergyman). Practically speaking, the need for afaqih can arise under extraordinary circumstances, he conceded. But once a chief executive is installed, a parliament is elected, and the government receives the latter's vote of confidence, then the need for afaqih lapses. Yet, the draft constitution rendered the office offaqih a permanent fixture of the political system. In Shari'atmadari's view, however, even during the state of emergency the faqih's powers must be restricted, especially by assigning command of the armed forces to an accountable government official. Failing that, the problem of autocracy would arise once again.34
These arguments contrasted sharply with the views expressed by Ayatullah Khumayni in his 1971 book, Islamic Government. There, he consistently demands clergy activism in politics, citing a hadith attributed to Imam 'Ali concerning the prophet's supplication to God to bless those coming after him. Asked who will be his successors, the prophet had responded, "Those who But Shari'atmadari-this time joined by the immensely popular Taliqanidemurred, countering that in his opinion clergy activism had produced so many problems that he appealed to them to return to the mosques.36 As if to underline that this statement was not fortuitous, he repeated it four months later, adding for good measure that to his mind the high clergy ought to avoid commerce, as well.37
On the role of educators, Ayatullah Shari'atmadari informed a group of visiting university professors at a time particularly trying for them that no group in society could serve it better than theirs.38 By contrast, Khumayni has furiously demanded a purge of the universities, condemning them for harboring what he has termed communists, American agents, and imperialists.39
On the Kurdish question, Shari'atmadari aligned himself with the RC emissary, Ayatullah Taliqani, who stood for negotiation and reconciliation with the Kurds.40 Khumayni, however, rejected Taliqani's recommendations, linked the Maoist Komela with the Kurdish Democratic Party in an undifferentiated "communist" alliance, and sent the Iranian revolutionary guards into the Kurdish cities. His feelings on this issue were so strong that he threatened to bring these guards before the revolutionary courts should they fail to suppress the Kurdish movement.4' Differences between the pair arose, too, on the taking of the American hostages. To Shari'atmadari, the action corresponded with revolutionary praxis, but not with the laws and prescriptions of Islam.42 He held this view in the face of Khumayni's anti-American speeches during the week preceding the embassy capture. Khumayni's subsequent comments that the embassy had been a "nest of spies" and his warnings about imminent American intervention suggest that the action had his approval once it had taken place. Other elements of difference between the grand mujtahids include Shari'atmadari's rebukes to IRP officials for seeking to monopolize power and for spreading a climate of revenge in the country.43 For Khumayni, monolithic unity appears as a categorical imperative, sustained by his threats to purge the bazaars, the ranks of the revolutionary guards, and even the revolutionary courts should they fail to evince sufficient revolutionary militance. His militance informs even his more conciliatory moments, as when he appealed to dissenting clergymen to unite in the new regime to prevent "those sitting in Paris" from overthrowing the Islamic Republic. If these clerics did not desist, Khumayni admonished, the masses would know where duty lay in the face of their "treason."44 Denying Khumayni's charge that the regime's problems were attributable to agents of imperialism, communism, and Zionism, Shari'atmadari ironically expressed his hope that the three million members of the MPP were not all "foreign agents."45 Shari'atmadari's greater moderation emerged not only in the context of his appeal to the IRP to let non-IRP groups operate in the open. It ultimately encompassed the question of the fate of the shah. To him, the physical return of the shah to Iran was unimportant, provided the wealth he had taken out of the country were restored to the Iranian people.46 But Ayatullah Khumayni's position was that the revolution would never be consummated without putting the shah on trial and revealing the true nature of his rule to the world. A trial, for him, would mark the end of Western penetration, expurgate past sins, and provide funds for development purposes.
A number of other senior and junior clergymen also expressed dismay, anger, and criticism against the clergy leaders of the IRP. In some cases, the criticism was merely implied, as, for example, when Ayatullah Taliqani actually boycotted the meetings of the RC in the months preceding his death, despite his incumbency as its chairman.47
In Born out of protest against the Pahlavi corporatist state, the revolution has provided grounds for confrontation and controversy among those who actively brought it about. The new theocratic state certainly reversed the trend, prominent in the post-1963 period, toward increasing bureaucratization of power. The new state structure differs from the old in a double sense: it is, so far, weaker than its predecessor, but its leaders also aspire to have it penetrate the lives of the people more extensively than its counterpart under the shah. In any revolution, of course, the state is at least originally weakened, and whether or not the theocratic state order of the Islamic Republic will be able to organize the lives of Iranians according to desired patterns of equality, capacity, solidarity, and stability cannot yet be determined.
What is clear is that the clergy have acted in a manner unprecedented in Iran's history. While doctrine provided sanction to the clergy's role as mem- The same thought applies, mutatis mutandis, in the present essay. The only intent is to determine the nature of the clergy's role in the revolution and to account for their mutual relations during its course.
Shi'ism has proven a difficult concept and practice for the sociologist of religion to grasp. Like the proverbial blind men trying to fathom the identity of the elephant they are touching, the social actors in the Iranian revolution also appear to be reaching different conclusions. In the process, they seem to be altering their discourse, as well. Simultaneously, shifting and even unprincipled coalitions, which have characterized the social reality of the revolution since its inception, continue to appear. 
